Censorship is Futile by Nabi, Zubair
Resistance Censorship is Futile
Zubair Nabi
IBM Research – Ireland
zubairn@ie.ibm.com
Abstract
The Internet has become the new battle ground between
authoritarian regimes and ordinary individuals who want
unimpeded access to information. The immense popu-
larity of online activism and citizen journalism enabled
by social media has instigated state level players to par-
tially or completely block access to the Internet. In re-
turn, individuals and organizations have been employing
various anti-censorship tools to circumvent these restric-
tions. In this paper, we claim that censorship is futile as
not only has it been ineffective in restricting access, it has
also had the side-effect of popularising blocked content.
Using data from Alexa Web Rankings, Google Trends,
and YouTube Statistics, we quantify the ineffectiveness
of state level censorship in Pakistan and Turkey and high-
light the emergence of the Streisand Effect. We hope that
our findings will, a) prove to governments and other play-
ers the futility of their actions, and b) aid citizens around
the world in using legal measures to counteract censor-
ship by showing its ineffectiveness.
1 Introduction
The popularity of the Internet is a double-edged sword:
it opens up a world of information and promotes free
speech but at the same time, this popularity incites au-
thoritarian regimes and other actors to repress access
to it. As a result, at present more than 60 countries
around the world censor the Internet in one form or an-
other [7]. These forms include all-out blocking [15],
partial blocking at different levels [38, 46, 2], perfor-
mance degradation/throttling [1], and content manipula-
tion [3, 47]. To stem this suppression tide, researchers
and activists are actively developing an arsenal of var-
ious anti-censorship tools [27, 50, 16, 21, 8, 12, 29].
Cognizant of this, censors are trying to stay ahead of
the curve [48, 40, 22]. This has led to a cat and mouse
game between censors and anti-censorship practitioners,
with no end in sight, similar to the struggle between
encryption-decryption [31].
Fortunately, this tug of war has not dampened the de-
sire of users around the world to gain unimpeded access
to the Internet. On the one hand, they are readily using
various methods to circumvent restrictions [38] and on
the other they are helping others to do the same through
ingenious mechanisms, such as putting up addresses of
open DNS servers as wall graffiti [51]. In a similar vein,
in spite of restrictions and the risk associated with by-
passing them, the usage of social media and blogs has
been escalating [10]. At the other end of the spectrum,
all of this online activism has induced some governments
to pass “Internet Constitutions” to enshrine freedom of
expression, net neutrality, and online privacy [36].
Essentially, at the very core, the goal of a censor is
to restrict access to content that is deemed detrimental
to a certain vested interest. This blackout often backfires
and causes the content to go viral following the Streisand
Effect [25]. The Streisand Effect can be defined as the
inadvertent popularity of any material as a result of its
suppression (Details in §2.1). In recent years a num-
ber of instances of this phenomenon have been recorded.
These include the swell in the number of Twitter users
after the website was blocked in Turkey [49], the popu-
larity of the online activism portal Avaaz’s posters to ban
South Africa’s lion bone trade [42], and the re-posting
of the “Station hertzienne militaire de Pierre-sur-Haute”
entry on Wikipedia after the latter was forced by French
Intelligence to delete it [23]. While the Internet is re-
plete with examples of this phenomenon, the evidence
is mostly anecdotal and not in the context of state-level
censorship.
To remedy this, we present, to the best of our knowl-
edge, the first formal study of the Streisand Effect in
state-level censorship. With Pakistan and Turkey as a
case study, using data from Google Trends, YouTube
Video Statistics, and Alexa Web Rankings, we show that
censorship has, a) not affected the ranking of websites
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Date Event ID Description
February 22, 2008 PK1 YouTube censored in retaliation to the movie “Fitna”
May 19, 2010 PK2 Facebook, YouTube, Flickr, and Wikipedia blocked due to “Everybody Draw
Muhammad Day”
September 17, 2012 PK3 YouTube blocked in reaction to another controversial movie “Innocence of
Muslims”
Table 1: Censorship Events in Pakistan
Date Event ID Description
May 08, 2008 TR1 YouTube blocked due to videos offensive to Mustafa Kemal Ataturk
January 27, 2014 TR2 SoundCloud blocked to stop access to leaked audio tapes of the Turkish Prime
Minister and his main political rival in a possible graft case
March 20, 2014 TR3 Twitter blocked to suppress access to leaked recordings allegedly implicating
the Turkish Prime Minister and his inner circle in various corruption scandals
March 27, 2014 TR4 YouTube censored to block access to audio recordings of government officials
discussing a possible military strike inside Syria
Table 2: Censorship Events in Turkey
such as YouTube, and b) it has had the side-effect of
causing restricted content to go viral. The goal of this
paper is two-fold: to dissect the Streisand Effect in the
context of state-level censorship and also, possibly more
importantly, to aid citizens around the world in using le-
gal measures to counteract censorship. For instance, for
the past two years activists have been fighting a case in a
provincial High Court in Pakistan to unblock YouTube.
The ineffectiveness of the ban has even prodded the lead
judge to remark at one point: “What the government is
saying is a joke. Every child is accessing YouTube. It’s
a fraud against the people of Pakistan” [41]. Unfortu-
nately, most of the information about censorship circum-
vention and the Streisand Effect is circumstantial and
anecdotal, to which the law is blind. Therefore, a formal
study with concrete numbers can fortify the case for the
futility of Internet censorship around the world. It has al-
ready proven effective in countries like Turkey where the
ban on Twitter was lifted recently after the constitutional
court ruled it as illegal [39].
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In §2
we give background information about the Streisand Ef-
fect and the various data sources used in the paper. §3
presents our findings. We discuss the implications of the
findings in §4. §5 concludes the paper and also discusses
future directions.
2 Setting The Stage
In this section, we give the reader background informa-
tion about the Streisand Effect, Alexa Web Rankings,
Google Trends, and YouTube Video Statistics. In addi-
tion, we give details of Internet censorship in our two
target countries: Pakistan and Turkey.
2.1 Streisand Effect
The Streisand Effect is named after the singer Barbara
Streisand who in 2003 unsuccessfully tried to have an
aerial picture of her Malibu beach house taken down
from the website of an environmental activist [25]. She
subsequently lost the $50 million lawsuit but the ensu-
ing media coverage brought more than a million visi-
tors to the said website. Since then, the Streisand Ef-
fect has become synonymous with the unintentional vi-
rality of any information, online or otherwise, as a con-
sequence of any attempt to censor, suppress, and/or con-
ceal it. This phenomenon has manifested itself in a di-
verse array of settings. Examples include unsuccessful
lawsuits and injunctions [43, 30], personal liberty [9],
and even scientific research [26]. Over the years, the
effect has been leveraged by individuals and organiza-
tions alike to repel censorship. For instance, the Amer-
ican Library Association and others have been organiz-
ing a Banned Books week since 1982 to raise awareness
about banned and restricted books [17]. Similarly, at-
torneys frequently advise their clients not to pursue li-
bel cases that can potentially raise interest in the issue
rather than subdue it [33]. Above all, the Streisand Ef-
fect has been successfully used by numerous individuals
around the world to take the fight to government man-
dated censorship [18, 49, 25]. It is important to highlight
that while the positive effects of the effect are an effective
tool against censorship, it is by no means a panacea. To
counteract online censorship around the world, we still
require an ecosystem of activists and tools. We discuss
this in detail in §4.2.
2
2.2 Pakistan
With a population size almost half of South America
and an almost comparable number of absolute Internet
users [38, 28], Pakistan has experienced Internet censor-
ship in many forms over the years. Popular websites such
as Google, Facebook, Flickr, Wikipedia, and YouTube
have borne the brunt of restrictions in recent years. At
times, the side-effects of this censorship have affected
connectivity outside the country as well [6]. From a tech-
nical perspective, websites are blocked at both the DNS
level as well as the HTTP level [38]. These restrictions
are imposed through technology from Netsweeper at the
IXP level [44]. In addition, citizens are also spied upon
through FinSpy [37]. Fortunately, Pakistan also has an
extremely vibrant social activism community which has
legally challenged Internet censorship and surveillance
within the country [41, 35]. Table 1 shows three major
censorship events from the country under consideration
in this paper.
2.3 Turkey
An Internet penetration of close to 49% makes Turkey
one of the most connected countries in the world [19]. It
also has the highest Twitter penetration in the world [4].
In addition, 72% of the Internet users access newspapers
and magazines online [45] enabling them to be politically
informed. Unfortunately in the last few years, Turkey has
gone from relatively benign online censorship to “one of
the world’s most determined Internet censors” [32]. In
fact, the Turkish parliament recently passed legislation
that allows the authorities to block any website while
bypassing the courts [5]. In addition, Internet service
providers are bound to keep tabs on a user’s online ac-
tivity for two years for use by the authorities. Similar to
Pakistan, Turkey also has a very active online community
whose activism recently prompted its top court to deem
the ban on Twitter as illegal [39]. Four main censorship
events from Turkey are listed in Table 2.
2.4 Alexa Web Rankings
Alexa1 is a web analytics company that provides traf-
fic analysis and rankings for top level domains. Traffic
rankings–which are updated daily–are calculated by us-
ing crowd-sourced data from its browser toolbar. A web-
site’s rank is a function of the number of unique visitors
and page views. Alexa’s web portal displays rankings via
three views: 1) global, 2) country-wise, and 3) category-
wise. In addition, Alexa also exposes a Web Information
Service API that allows the user to query historical data
through Amazon Web Services.
1http://www.alexa.com/
Date Ranking
April, 2009 5
February, 2010 5
March, 2010 4
July, 2011 4
August, 2011 4
September, 2011 4
May, 2013 9
August, 2013 10
May, 2014 10
June, 2014 10
July, 2014 11
Table 3: Alexa Ranking for YouTube in Pakistan
2.5 Google Trends
Google Trends2 is a time series index of search term vol-
ume entered into Google in a geographic region [11].
The index is calculated by normalizing the total query
volume for a specific term by the total number of queries
in that region. The maximum value is 100 and indexes
can be searched back till January 1, 2004. Google Trends
have found wide traction for trend prediction, from eco-
nomic indicators [11] to disease epidemics [24]. Similar
to Alexa, Google Trends has both a web-based portal as
well as a back-end API.
2.6 YouTube Video Statistics
Statistics for a YouTube video can be enabled by the
uploader for public consumption. These statistics can
include a time series of views, duration of views, and
shares. Instead of sharing raw numbers, the portal only
exposes generated charts of regular time series or CDFs.
In addition, no external API is available to access this
information.
3 Results
This section presents the results of our analysis. We first
analyze the ranking of YouTube (§3.1), followed by the
popularity of individual topics (§3.2). We then drill down
into individual pieces of restricted content (§3.3) and also
examine the popularity of anti-censorship tools (§3.4).
3.1 Website Ranking
YouTube has primarily borne the brunt of censorship in
Pakistan. Most notably, it was first briefly banned in
2008 and since September, 2012 has experienced an in-
definite blockage [38]. To gauge whether this censor-
ship has had any effect on the usage of the website in the
2http://www.google.com/trends/
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Date Ranking
April, 2009 8
June, 2009 8
February, 2010 5
September, 2011 3
October, 2011 3
April, 2012 3
May, 2012 3
May, 2013 3
November, 2013 3
March, 2014 4
June, 2014 4
July, 2014 4
Table 4: Alexa Ranking for YouTube in Turkey
country (or more specifically its ranking), we make use
of data from Alexa Web Rankings. Unfortunately, Alexa
no longer allows the user to query historical data for a
specific country and only displays the current ranking on
its website. To work around this, we use the Wayback
Machine3 from Internet Archive–which caches previous
versions of websites–to access previous rankings. Ta-
ble 3 presents the ranking of YouTube in Pakistan for all
Alexa snapshots from the Wayback Machine. It is clear
that the ban on YouTube in Pakistan has not affected its
rankings or indirectly its usage in the country. Specifi-
cally, in spite of the indefinite ban since 2012, the web-
site has been consistently amongst the top 11 websites in
the country.
Similar to Pakistan, Turkey has also blocked YouTube
multiple times in the last few years. The longest ban
lasted 30 months, from May, 2008 till October, 2010. It
also remained blocked between March, 2014 and June,
2014. In spite of this, Alexa Rankings data in Table 4
shows that YouTube remained amongst the top 10 most
visited websites in Turkey during both censorship peri-
ods.
Limitations: While the data we collected clearly
shows a censorship ineffectiveness trend, the wide gaps
in the data do not permit us to claim that the behaviour
holds throughout. Nonetheless, it shows that at least
for certain months users were not deterred from access-
ing YouTube during the various blackout periods in both
countries. To examine whether there is a correlation be-
tween content popularity and censorship, we next ana-
lyze data for specific events.
3.2 Topic Trends
Having shown that censorship has not affected the rank-
ing of YouTube in Pakistan and Turkey, we now dissect
3https://archive.org/web/
Figure 1: Search Volume for “Fitna” in Pakistan. The
green dotted line marks the upload date on YouTube and
the red dashed line marks its censorship.
individual censorship events to study the manifestation
of the Streisand Effect. To this end, we use data from
Google Trends as a metric to gauge the popularity of
restricted content. We first examine data from Pakistan
followed by Turkey. As listed in Table 1, YouTube was
blocked in Pakistan in February 2008 (PK1) for a few
days in retaliation to the controversial movie “Fitna”; the
trailer for which was uploaded to YouTube in January
of the same year. In addition to Pakistan, several other
countries, including Indonesia, also blocked YouTube
in response. Somewhat amusingly, Pakistan restricted
access to the website via BGP misconfiguration. This
made the website globally inaccessible for a large part
of the Internet for nearly 2 hours [38]. Figure 1 shows
the Google search volume for the term “Fitna” for users
within Pakistan in 2007 and 2008. The dotted green
line represents the month in which the video was up-
loaded while the red dashed line marks the month when
YouTube was blocked in Pakistan. The blue line repre-
sents the actual search volume data. The data shows that
the popularity of the video spiked after it was restricted
in Pakistan.
We also see a similar trend in Turkey. Since Decem-
ber 2013 a Twitter user with ID “Haramzadeler” has been
using the website to share audio clips and documents im-
plicating the ruling Turkish government in massive cor-
ruption scandals. The collection also includes record-
ings of the Turkish Prime Minister and his friends and
family. In reaction to these exposs, the Turkish gov-
ernment blocked access to SoundCloud, YouTube, and
Twitter. In particular, SoundCloud was blocked in Jan-
uary 2014 (TR2 in Table 2). Figure 2 shows the Google
search volume for “Haramzadeler” in Turkey. The re-
sults show that searches for the term peaked as a result
of the blockage of SoundCloud in January even though
4
Figure 2: Search Volume for “Haramzadeler” in Turkey.
Audio uploaded on SoundCloud: green dotted line, cen-
sorship: red dashed line.
Haramzadeler started uploading content months before
that.
Limitations: From the two examples above, it is fairly
straight-forward to conclude that there is a strong corre-
lation between censorship and the popularity of the cen-
sored content. It also suggests that this is not merely
a case of the classic “correlation implies causation” fal-
lacy. Nonetheless, in other cases this is harder to claim.
For instance, Figure 34 shows Google Trends data for
Pakistan from May 2010 for “Everybody Draw Muham-
mad Day” (PK2 in Table 1). This event resulted in the
blockage of YouTube for a year. The finest granularity
at which Google Trends data is available is on a weekly
scale, therefore it is hard to tell if the content went viral
after YouTube was blocked due to the fact that the con-
tent upload and censorship took place during the same
week and hence the overlap between the green and red
vertical lines. We see a similar trend in 2012, when
YouTube was banned again due to another controversial
movie “Innocence of Muslims” (PK3 in Table 1). As
before, the green dotted line marks the time when the
video was uploaded, the red dashed line marks the point
at which the censorship was enforced, and the blue line
shows the search volume from within Pakistan in Fig-
ure 4. Again, from this data it is hard to conclude if the
censorship caused the popularity or vice versa.
3.3 Affected Content
So far we have been able to show that, a) censorship has
not affected website rankings in Pakistan and Turkey,
and b) topics spiked in popularity after they were cen-
4Note that the x-axis now has fine-grained weekly dated, unlike the
monthly data in Figure 1.
Figure 3: Search Volume for “Everybody Draw Muham-
mad Day” in Pakistan. Video upload: green dotted line,
censorship: red dashed line.
sored. The latter only applies to Google search popular-
ity of the content, not the content itself. Therefore, we
now analyze YouTube statistics to gauge whether we can
pin-point the Streisand Effect at play for the actual con-
tent. This task is complicated by two factors: a) YouTube
only serves graphs for statistics, not the underlying data,
and b) most of the contentious videos have now been
taken down. As a result, we only focus on one particular
clip which was uploaded to YouTube in February 2014,
wherein the Turkish Prime Minister allegedly discusses
construction permits for an area earmarked for a forest
with his friend who is a business tycoon and a real es-
tate developer. This video is amongst the set of content
which resulted in the censorship of both YouTube and
Twitter (TR3 and TR4 in Table 2) in Turkey in March
2014. Figure 5 plots the daily views of the said video.
It is clear from the graph that even though the video was
uploaded in February, its popularity spiked in March, af-
ter YouTube was censored.
Limitations: While the example under consideration
looks promising, it is the only one for which we were
able to obtain data. Therefore, a single video is insuffi-
cient to extrapolate to other events.
3.4 Circumvention
Our analysis thus far shows that censorship has not de-
terred users from accessing restricted content. In fact,
in certain cases the censorship has had the side-effect of
popularising the content. Bearing this in mind, the next
natural question is to ask how users are accessing the re-
stricted content. In case of Pakistan, in prior work [38]
we learned that users were actively making use of anti-
censorship tools, such as VPNs and Tor to circumvent
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Figure 4: Search Volume for “Innocence of Muslims” in
Pakistan. Video upload: green dotted line, censorship:
red dashed line.
censorship. To determine whether there is a correlation
between censorship and the use of anti-censorship tools,
we again rely on data from Google Trends. Specifically,
we note the search volume for “Spotflux”, “Tor”, “Ultra-
surf”, and “Hotspot Shield”. We also add two generic
circumvention terms viz “Unblock” and “Proxy”. The
data is visualized in Figure 6, the two red dashed lines
mark PK2 and PK3, respectively. We see that the popu-
larity of these tools spiked as a result of the two censor-
ship events. Note that Spotflux was not available before
PK2, that is why there is no spike in its search volume.
We also conducted a similar study for Turkey, with the
results presented in Figure 7. In this case, the four red
lines represent TR1, TR2, TR3, and TR4, respectively.
Again, we see that the popularity of these tools is posi-
tively correlated with the four censorship events. Unlike
Pakistan, where Tor is popular in the entire time series,
in Turkey its usage seems to have started only after TR3
and TR4.
4 Discussion
Using limited and sparse data from multiple sources we
have been able to show that not only does censorship not
work but it also inadvertently causes restricted content to
become popular. This is a promising line of work but
before Internet activists around the world can claim a
convincing victory against the spectre of censorship, we
need to analyze more comprehensive data. Towards this
end, we now discuss how additional data might be use-
ful and we also call upon organizations, such as Alexa
and Google, who might hold this data to share it with the
research community so that they can comb through it.
Figure 5: Daily video viewership statistics for an alleged
conversation between the Turkish Prime Minister and a
business tycoon. The x-axis is time and the y-axis is
daily number of views. Graph was directly copied from
YouTube.
4.1 Open Data Against Censorship
In §3.1, using data from Alexa Web Rankings, we ar-
gued that website level censorship has not diminished
the usage of YouTube in Pakistan and Turkey for cer-
tain months. But the lack of monthly data throughout
the events deters us from claiming the consistency of the
trend. Similarity, in §3.2, using Google Trends data, we
showed that certain pieces of content went viral after be-
ing censored, arguing for a cause and effect relationship
between the latter and the former. While this trend was
clear for PK1 and TR2, the weekly granularity of the data
prevents us from verifying this for PK2 and PK3. Fine-
grained daily data would be sufficient for teasing out the
presence of the Streisand Effect. In the same vein, data
about the usage of other videos on YouTube would be
effective in inspecting the effect for individual pieces of
content. In addition, data from ISPs and Content Dis-
tribution Networks would be useful in examining access
patterns during periods of censorship at a finer granu-
larity. We hope that all of these organizations that are
sitting on top of these silos of data will make it publicly
available, similar to the filtering data5 from the OpenNet
Initiative.
4.2 The Streisand Effect as a means to an
end
The Streisand Effect in a large number of instances show-
cases the futility of online censorship. Primarily, it shows
that banning content on the Internet generates more in-
terest in the content and increases its circulation. Cog-
nizance of this phenomenon is slowly driving public pol-
icy and discourse. A recent example of this is the after-
5https://opennet.net/research/data
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Figure 6: Search Volume for anti-censorship tools in Pakistan. The red lines mark PK2 and PK3, respectively.
math of the May, 2014 European Court of Justice rul-
ing in the Google vs Gonza´lez case. Under this “right
to be forgotten” ruling, individuals have the right to re-
quest search engines to remove personal data from search
results [20]. In the ensuing debate, EU countries have
been weighing the implications and practicality of the
EU-wide “General Data Protection Regulation”. Italy
for instance in one of its proposals assumed that individ-
uals want an umbrella removal of their personal infor-
mation, which potentally requires a search engine such
as Google to reach out to third parties, e.g. individual
social network users or people with personal webpages,
to cascade information deletion. In reaction, Poland
opined that the assumption is ill-founded and the re-
quired multimodal removal effort will most likely trigger
the Streisand Effect as it will draw more attention to the
content [14]. Under Poland’s proposition, users should
be able to choose which information to remove and from
where. For example, a user might want a certain piece
of information to be removed from Google search results
but still be available on a blog. Therefore, awareness
of the effect will be influential in defining digital rights
policy in the EU. In a similar vein, we believe that gov-
ernments that directly censor information on the Internet
need to be mindful of inadvertent consequences of their
actions. For example, countries like Pakistan and Turkey,
regularly ban online content to safeguard the religious
and social sensibilities of their citizens. Our examination
of this category of censorship in this paper has shown
that it has largely been ineffective. Knowledge of this
observation should prompt state-level censors to rethink
their position and explore alternative mechanisms to deal
with such issues–for example, by directly engaging with
their citizens and considering their points of view.
While the Streisand Effect is a handy instrument to
keep censorship in check, it is only one of the many
means to an end, not an end in itself. The end being
an open, universally accessible Internet. To begin with,
the effect does not manifest in all instances of censor-
ship. The rampant presence of censorship around the
world is a testament to this [7]. Secondly, the goal of
this paper is not to argue that online activists need to
7
Figure 7: Search Volume for anti-censorship tools in Turkey. The red lines mark TR1 TR2, TR3, and TR4, respectively.
become complacent and actually embrace online cen-
sorship as it, due to the Streisand Effect, achieves the
goal of proving its own ineffectiveness. On the contrary,
anti-censorship efforts need to be beefed up in terms of
political activism and campaigning, design of appropri-
ate tools, and identification and measurement of Inter-
net restrictions to keep up with the increase in country-
level censorship [34]. Specifically, once content has been
blocked, anti-censorship tools such as VPNs and proxies
need to be employed. Without these tools the category
of the Streisand Effect presented in this paper would not
originate in the first place. Furthermore, the initial study
and measurement of Internet censorship enables the de-
sign of tools to counteract it. For instance, ignoring TCP
RST packets as a method to bypass the Great Firewall
of China came about as a result of studying its modus
operandi [13]. Finally, the efforts of Internet freedom
activists in recent years have been effective in raising
awareness. In some cases–for instance, in Turkey [39]–
they have even succeeded in getting content unblocked
through legal recourses. Overall, the Streisand Effect
would not exist if all of the above efforts were aban-
doned. In essence, the aim of this paper is to raise
awareness about the Streisand Effect in the context of
state-level censorship rather than to argue for it as an all-
encompassing anti-censorship mechanism.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
By making use of data from Google Trends, YouTube
Statistics, and Alexa Web Rankings, we were able to
not only show that censorship is ineffective but rather
that it also has the inadvertent effect of making restricted
content go viral. Specifically, we show that the national
ranking of YouTube in Pakistan and Turkey has remained
largely the same in spite of multiple censorship events. In
addition, Google Trends and YouTube Statistics numbers
show that blocked videos spiked in popularity after they
were censored. This paper was just an initial window
into the interplay of the Streisand Effect and state-level
censorship. In the future, we aim to extend our study
8
to other countries. In addition, we hope to make use of
other datasets to augment our current findings. Finally,
Google Trends data also breaks down search volume by
region. It would interesting to work out say if censor-
ship circumvention is an urban or rural phenomenon in
Pakistan and Turkey.
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